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CASE NOTES 
Constitutional Law-PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-STUDENT HAS 
RIGHT TO HAVE ATTORNEY PRESENT AT UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY 
HEARING WHEN CRIMINAL CHARGES ARE PE~~1~G-Gabri~owit~ U. 
Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978). 
In November 1977, Steven A. Gabrilowitz, a senior a t  the 
University of Rhode Island, was charged with assault with intent 
to commit rape on another student. A few days later, he received 
a letter from the university directing him to appear before the 
University Board on Student Conduct to defend against the same 
allegation. * 
The rules governing a student's rights at university discipli- 
nary hearings prohibited the assistance or presence of legal coun- 
sel a t  the hearing.2 Claiming he had a constitutional right to legal 
counsel, Gabrilowitz petitioned the federal district court for an 
injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983.3 The district court 
granted a preliminary injunction against officials of the univer- 
sity, restraining them from conducting the disciplinary hearing 
1. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 101 (1st Cir. 1978). Gabrilowitz was also 
directed to defend against a second allegation involving a later assault on the same 
student. Id. 
2. Id. at  101-02. A student at the University of Rhode Island was not "permitted to 
employ professional legal counsel or other persons from outside the University Community 
to present the case before the hearing board," although he had "the right to request the 
assistance of an advisor of hislher choice from the community." Id. at  102 (quoting 
RAMPAGES § 23.6 (student's guide to the university)). 
3. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976): 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus- 
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at  law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Since claims under this Civil Rights Act must be founded upon deprivations resulting 
from state action, private institutions have been distinguished from tax-supported institu- 
tions. E.g., Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia 
Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a discussion of the concept of "state action" 
and the private college, see O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L.
REV. 155 (1970); Wilkinson & Rolapp, The Private College and Student Discipline, 56 
A.B.A.J. 121 (1970); Note, Legal Relationship Between the Student and the Private Col- 
lege or University, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 244 (1970); Comment, Student Due Process in the 
Private University: The State Action Doctrine, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 911 (1969); Comment, 
Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities, 5 WILL AM^ 
L.J. 277 (1969); 44 TUL. L. REV. 184 (1969). 
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against Gabrilowitz unless he was allowed representation by an 
attorney of his ~hoice.~ 
In Gabrilowitz v. N e ~ r n a n , ~  the United States Court of Ap- 
peals for the First Circuit, with Judge Campbell dissenting, mod- 
ified and then affirmed the order of the district court. The court 
concluded that because of the pending criminal charges, the ap- 
pellee, Gabrilowitz, had a due process right to have his lawyer 
present at the disciplinary hearing for consultation and advice." 
Implicit in the issue of whether appellee in the instant case 
has the right to have his attorney present at the college discipli- 
nary hearing is the broader question of whether an accused in a 
criminal proceeding has the right to have his attorney present a t  
a parallel civil proceeding. Resolution of both questions requires 
application of procedural due process theory. 
A. Procedural Due Process 
The procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth 
amendment provide protection for individuals faced with govern- 
mental actions that may deprive them of private interests.' Under 
most circumstances, the minimum procedural safeguards re- 
quired by the fourteenth amendment are adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard? Additional safeguards may be required, 
depending upon the circumstances of each case.' 
Traditionally, the due process requirements of a particular 
case are determined by applying a procedural due process balanc- 
ing test.1° In applying the test, a court balances the interests of 
the individual affected by the governmental action in question 
4. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, No. 77-686 (D.R.I. Dec. 15,1977) (order granting prelimi- 
nary injunction), aff'd as modified, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir., 1978). 
5. 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978). 
6. Id. a t  107. 
7. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part: "No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
6 1. 
8. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 
371 (1971); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Baker v. Baker, Eccles 
& Co., 242 U S .  394 (1917). 
9. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
10. E.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948, 953 n.3 (1978); Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families for Equity and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,848-49 (1977); Dixon 
v.  Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-15 (1977); Ingrahan v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977); 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
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against the government's interest in avoiding the burdens that a 
particular safeguard would impose.ll Slight factual variations 
become extremely important in this balancing process and much 
discretion is left with the court to fix values on the respective 
interests involved. Because the concept of procedural due process 
is so elusive,12 the few courts that have confronted the issue of 
whether a student has a due process right to counsel at a discipli- 
nary hearing have reached divergent conclusions. 
B. Right to Counsel at Student Disciplinary Proceedings 
Dixon u. Alabama State Board of Education13 is recognized 
authority for the position that, a t  a minimum, due process re- 
quires that a student be given notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing before being expelled from a tax-supported college for 
misconduct.14 In Dixon, the court indicated that before a student 
can be expelled he must be informed of the specific charges 
against him and the grounds which justify his expulsion, be given 
the names of accusing witnesses and the facts to which each 
witness testifies, and have an opportunity at the hearing to pre- 
sent his own defense.15 
The right to counsel was not mentioned in Dixon as a requi- 
11. The due process balancing test is described by the Supreme Court in Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976): 
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific 
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 
12. As Chief Justice Warren stated in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960), 
"'Due Process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content 
varies according to specific factual contexts." 
13. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.) (black college students expelled without adequate notice 
or hearing for alleged disruptions and demonstrations), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
14. 294 F.2d at 158. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975); Vargas v. 
Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1974); Blanton v. State Univ., 489 F.2d 377, 385 (2d 
Cir. 1973). 
15. 294 F.2d at 158-59. However, the court also pointed out 
[tlhis is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross- 
examine witnesses, is required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and 
disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college's educa- 
tional atmosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of 
an adversary proceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon the inter- 
ests of the college. 
Id. a t  159. 
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site of due process. Several courts have relied on this omission as 
support for the view that the right to counsel is not one of the 
required safeguards at a disciplinary hearing? In addition, courts 
have refused to recognize a student's right to the assistance of 
counsel for a variety of other reasons. They have pointed out, for 
example, that the hearing is nonadjudicative in nature" and 
should be kept informal.lR Some courts have reasoned that a liter- 
ate and educated student should be able to adequately defend 
himself without the presence of legal counsel.lg Other courts have 
emphasized that undesirable consequences would result from the 
interference courts would impose upon a college's right to formu- 
late its own disciplinary  procedure^.^^ 
In contrast to the above reasoning, some courts have recog- 
nized a right to counsel a t  student disciplinary  hearing^.^' These 
courts have generally concluded that the risk of expulsion is a 
sufficiently serious deprivation to mandate this procedural safe- 
guard? They have stressed the benefits of legal counsel in pro- 
16. E.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1967) (junior high 
school student had no right to be represented by counsel a t  guidance conference concern- 
ing his suspension), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 
807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967) (merchant marine cadet dismissed from academy had right to  
evidentiary hearing, but no right to counsel); Haynes v. Dallas County Junior College 
Dist., 386 F. Supp. 208,212 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (college student denied counsel a t  suspension 
hearing); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 236 (S.D.W. Va.) (college students sus- 
pended for disorderly conduct were not entitled to counsel a t  hearing), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 
(4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969); Due v. Florida A & M Univ., 233 F. 
Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (students convicted of contempt did not have right to  
counsel a t  subsequent college disciplinary hearing). 
17. E.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Barker v. 
Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 238 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969). 
18. E.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 1972). 
19. E.g., id. a t  211-12; Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); 
Garshman v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912, 921 (M.D. Pa. 1975). 
20. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Garshman v. 
Pennsylvania State Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912, 921 (M.D. Pa. 1975). 
21. E.g, Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 
1973) (high school students entitled to representation of counsel when facing suspension 
or expulsion); Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (high school 
students entitled to counsel a t  expulsion hearing); Marin v. University of P.R., 377 F. 
Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974) (university students entitled to assistance of retained coun- 
sel); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202,209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (children may not be excluded 
from elementary school without a hearing a t  which retained counsel may participate); 
French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. La. 1969) (university student entitled 
to retained, but not appointed counsel a t  expulsion hearing); Esteban v. Central Mo. 
State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (university student has right to  
presence of counsel a t  disciplinary hearing, although he has no right to full representa- 
tion). 
22. The court in the instant case, however, felt the risk of expulsion alone was insuffi- 
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tecting a student's interests at the hearing,23 the fact that com- 
mentators favor the recognition of a right to counsel in discipli- 
nary  proceeding^,'^ and the finding that intrusions upon the 
school or college would be minimaleZ5 
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the presence of 
legal counsel is required for a student facing expulsion at a disci- 
plinary hearing. However, in Goss u. Lopez,26 the Court did ad- 
dress the question of whether the right to counsel is a required 
procedural safeguard at a high school disciplinary proceeding in- 
volving short suspensions. 
In Goss, high school students in the Columbus, Ohio, public 
school system brought a class action seeking review of their tem- 
porary suspensions from high school. A three-judge federal dis- 
trict court held that the students had been denied due process of 
law because they had been suspended from their high schools 
without a hearing.27 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment 
of the district court and, on the issue of the students' right to 
counsel, stated: 
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to require, 
countrywide, that hearings in connection with short suspensions 
cient to mandate the presence of counsel at a disciplinary hearing. See notes 66, 92 and 
accompanying text infra. 
23. E.g., French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1377 (E.D. La. 1969). 
24. E.g., Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 
1973); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969). 
Not surprisingly, the majority of cases involving student disciplinary proceedings 
arose during the 1960's in a period of student activism and campus disorder. Numerous 
law review articles and comments written during this period discuss a student's right to 
counsel at college disciplinary hearings. E.g., Frey, The Right of Counsel in Student 
Disciplinary Hearings, 5 VAL. L. REV. 48 (1970); Heyman, Some Thoughts on University 
Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 73, 79-80 (1966); Johnson, The Constitutional 
Rights of College Students, 42 TEX.  L. REV. 344,352 (1964); Kutner, Habeas Scholastics: 
An Ombudsman for Academic Due Process-A Proposal, 23 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 107, 147 
(1968); Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights, and Responsibilities, 54 
CALIF. L. REV. 23, 37 (1966); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DEN. 
L.J. 582, 593 (1968); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 
1075-76 (1969); Project-Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder: A Comparison of 
Law and Practice, 1970 DUKE L.J. 763, 783-85; Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably En- 
forced-Guidelines for University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L. REV. 301, 323 
(1968); Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment and University Disciplinary Procedures, 
34 Mo. L. REV. 236, 249-51 (1969); Note, Student Discipline Cases at State Universities 
in New 1Mexico-Procedural Due Process, N.M.L. REV. 231,236-39 (1971); Comment, The 
College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REV. 87, 106-09 
(1968); Comment, School Expulsions and Due Process, 14 U .  KAN. L. REV. 108,113 (1965). 
25. E.g., Marin v. University of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974). 
26. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
27. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub nom. Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). However, the district court concluded that the schools were 
not required to permit the presence of counsel. 372 F. Supp. a t  1302. 
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must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or 
to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident.2u 
Although the Court intimated that counsel might be required 
in cases involving expulsion or longer periods of suspens i~n ,~~ it 
did not reach that issue. Therefore, lower courts have admitted 
that there is a lack of established precedent involving the right 
to counsel where a student faces the risk of expulsion at  a college 
disciplinary hearing." 
C. Right to Counsel at Civil Proceedings Parallel to Criminal 
Actions 
The First Circuit in Gabrilowitz was faced with a legal ques- 
tion that surprisingly has not been resolved: Does an individual 
have a due process right to counsel at a civil proceeding where his 
testimony may be used against him in a pending criminal trial?31 
28. 419 U.S. a t  583. 
29. Id. a t  584: "In more difficult cases, [the disciplinarian] may permit coun- 
sel. . . . Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or perma- 
nently, may require more formal procedures." 
Recently, the Supreme Court has commented that more stringent procedural due 
process safeguards are required for college expulsions involving misconduct than for dis- 
missals based upon the failure to meet academic standards. Board of Curators v. Horo- 
witz, 98 S. Ct. 948,955 (1978). However, the Court did not state that these more stringent 
requirements include the right to counsel. 
30. E.g., Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d at 105; Garshman v. Pennsylvania State 
Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912,920 (M.D. Pa. 1975); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 
(E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed, 425 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1970). 
31. Appellee was arraigned before a district judge four days prior to the time he 
received notice to appear at the disciplinary hearing. Brief for Appellee at 4, Gabrilowitz 
v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir., 1978). Although an arraignment may be a "critical 
stage" which confers a sixth amendment right to counsel, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 
52 (1961), a college disciplinary hearing is obviously not part of the criminal proceeding. 
The sixth amendment right to counsel applies only to personal confrontations between the 
accused and the state in the prosecution of a criminal case. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 
300, 309-12 (1973); United States v. Wilcox, 507 F.2d 364,369 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
420 U.S. 979 (1975). 
The court in the instant case was faced with the question of whether an accused has 
a due process right to counsel a t  a parallel civil proceeding where his sixth amendment 
right to counsel does not attach. The district court believed this issue was one of first 
impression: "The court is unaware, and counsel have called no authority to its attention 
which holds that in the dilemma created by the parallel course of proceedings involved in 
this action, it has been held that due process does or does not require the right to counsel." 
Gabrilowitz v. Newman, No. 77-686 (D.R.I. Dec. 15, 1977) (order granting preliminary 
injunction). 
The First Circuit pointed out that two cases, Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133 
Vt. 225, 335 A.2d 321 (1975), and Furutani v. Ewigleban, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 
1969), did "involve the specter of a pending criminal case hovering over the hearing." 582 
F.2d at 104. However, these cases did not deal with the right to counsel issue. In Nzuve 
the university disciplinary rules provided for the right to counsel at the hearing. 133 Vt. 
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Supreme Court decisions most directly applicable to this issue 
have involved civil proceedings such as fire marshal investiga- 
t i o n ~ , ~ ~  grand jury hearings,33 and prison disciplinary hearings34 
where a suspect, witness, or prisoner is denied the presence of his 
attorney despite the fact that his testimony may later be intro- 
duced against him should he be criminally charged.35 
In In re G r o b ~ n , ~ ~  the Supreme Court refused to recognize a 
right to counsel for witnesses at a state fire marshal's investiga- 
tion even though the witnesses were under suspicion of causing 
the fire under investigation. Emphasizing that this was not a 
proceeding that would adjudicate the witnesses' responsibility for 
the fire, the Court stated: 
The fact that appellants['] . . . testimony might provide 
a basis for criminal charges against them does not mean that 
they had a constitutional right to the assistance of their coun- 
sel. . . . Obviously in these situations evidence obtained may 
possibly lay a witness open to criminal charges. When such 
charges are made in a criminal proceeding, he then may demand 
the presence of his counsel for his defense. Until then his protec- 
tion is the privilege against self-in~rirnination.~' 
Justice Black, writing for the dissent, argued that the due 
process clause requires the presence of counsel when a suspect is 
compelled to give testimony that may be used against him in a 
subsequent criminal action." Despite the persuasiveness of Jus- 
at  229, 335 A.2d a t  324. In Furutani an action was brought to enjoin college officials from 
conducting expulsion hearings until after the completion of the criminal trials arising out 
of the same misconduct for which the students had been suspended; no attack was made 
by the students on the disciplinary hearing itself. 
In Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 
(1968), the court took notice of the absence of pending criminal charges to justify its 
conclusion that due process did not mandate the presence of counsel in disciplinary 
hearings. ''[Vhere is no showing that any attempt is ever made to use any statement at  
the conference in any subsequent criminal proceeding. . . . Therefore, there is no need 
for counsel to protect the child in his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- 
incrimination." 386 F.2d a t  780. 
32. E.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). 
33. E.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976). 
34. E.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539 (1974). 
35. Legal distinctions between a suspect and an accused are discussed in notes 77- 
78, 89 infra. 
36. 352 U.S. 330 (1957). 
37. Id. at  332-33 (footnote omitted). 
38. Id. a t  344-46 (Black, J., dissenting):. 
It  may be that the type of interrogation which the Fire Marshall and his deputies 
are authorized to conduct would not technically fit into the traditional category 
of formal criminal proceedings, but the substantive effect of such interrogation 
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tice Black's dissenting opinion, Groban set the precedent for re- 
fusing to recognize a due process right to counsel in most investi- 
gative  proceeding^.^' 
In United States v. Mandujano,'O a witness had been subpoe- 
naed to testify before a grand jury investigating narcotics traffic. 
The witness was not given Miranda warnings and he was not 
allowed to have his attorney present in the grand jury room. 
Along with holding that a witness before a grand jury is not enti- 
tled to Miranda warnings, the Supreme Court stated: 
Respondent was also informed that if he desired he could 
have the assistance of counsel, but that counsel could not be 
inside the grand jury room. That statement was plainly a correct 
recital of the law. No criminal proceedings had been instituted 
against respondent, hence the Sixth Amendment right to coun- 
sel had not come into play. . . . Under settled principles the 
witness may not insist upon the presence of his attorney in the 
grand jury 
Justice Brennan disagreed with the conclusion that it is a 
"settled" principle that the right to counsel does not exist for 
grand jury witnesses.42 He argued that the guidance of counsel is 
on an eventual criminal prosecution of the person questioned can be so great 
that he should not be compelled to give testimony when he is deprived of the 
advice of his counsel. 
. . . .  
It is said that a witness can protect himself against some of the many abuses 
possible in a secret interrogation by asserting the privilege against self- 
incrimination. But this proposition collapses under any more than the most 
superficial consideration. The average witness has little if any idea when or how 
to raise any of his constitutional privileges. . . . [an view of the intricate 
possibilities of waiver which surround the privilege he may easily unwittingly 
waive it. 
39. See, e.g., Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 360 US. 287, 295 (1959), where the 
Court, basing its decision in part on Groban, held that there was no due process right to 
counsel in a purely investigative proceeding. 
40. 425 U.S. 564 (1976). 
41. Id. .at 581. As authority, the Court cited In re Groban, 352 U S .  330 (1957), and 
Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Groban, the Court had stated: 
"A witness before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on being 
represented by his counsel . . . . " 352 US. at 333 (footnote omitted). 
Rule 6(d) specifies who may be present in the grand jury room during federal investi- 
gations: 
Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when 
needed and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator 
of a recording device may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no 
person other than the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating 
or voting. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d). 
42. 425 US. at 603 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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generally necessary to enable a grand jury witness to effectively 
avoid prejudice to his fifth amendment privilege against self- 
incrimination .43 
Wolff v. M ~ D o n n e l l , ~ ~  decided in 1974, was the first major 
Supreme Court opinion to discuss. the ramifications of recogniz- 
ing a right to counsel at prison disciplinary hearings. The Court 
reasoned that the presence of a prisoner's attorney would give the 
hearing a more "adversary cast," delay the proceedings, and re- 
duce the effectiveness of such hearings "as a means to further 
correctional goals." The Court concluded: "At this stage of the 
development of these procedures we are not prepared to hold that 
inmates have a right to either retained or appointed counsel in 
disciplinary proceedings. "45 
Two years after Wolff, the Supreme Court again considered 
the question of whether the presence of counsel is necessary to 
protect a prisoner's rights at a disciplinary hearing. In Barter u. 
Palmigiano, 46 the prisoner, Palmigiano, was informed that crimi- 
nal charges might be filed against him for inciting a disturbance 
at the prison. He was also required to appear before the prison 
disciplinary board to face possible disciplinary action for his al- 
leged misconduct. He was not allowed to have his attorney pres- 
ent at this hearing. Palmigiano chose to remain silent and the 
disciplinary board punished him for his involvement in the dis- 
turbance. 
The First Circuit held that Palmigiano was entitled to the 
It is true that dictum in In re Groban, 352 US. 330,333 (1957), denied that 
there is any constitutional right of a witness to be represented by counsel when 
testifying before a grand jury. But neither Groban nor any other case in this 
Court has squarely presented the question. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
43. Id. a t  604 (quoting Manes v. Meyers, 419 US. 449, 466 (1975)): 
"The assertion of a testimonial privilege, as of many other rights, often 
depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained and skilled in the 
subject matter, and who may offer a more objective opinion. A layman may not 
be aware of the precise scope, the nuances, and boundaries of his Fifth Amend- 
ment privilege. It is not a self-executing mechanism; it can be affirmatively 
waived, or lost by not asserting it in a timely fashion." 
Consistent with Justice Brennan's criticism, some commentators have argued that 
counsel should be present a t  investigations before a grand jury. E.g., Boudin, The Federal 
Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 1 (1972); Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 
10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 807 (1972); Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 
F.R.D. 189 (1967); Comment, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DUKE 
L.J. 97. 
44. 418 US. 539 (1974). 
45. Id. a t  570. 
46. 425 US. 308 (1976). 
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presence of counsel at the disciplinary hearing since statements 
made at the hearing could be used in a later criminal prosecution 
for the same misc~nduct .~~  The Supreme Court did not agree, 
noting that "[nlo criminal proceedings are or were pending 
against Palmigiano. The State has not . . . sought to make evi- 
dentiary use of his silence at the disciplinary hearing in any crim- 
inal pro~eeding."~~ Stressing the "peculiar environment of the 
prison setting,"" the Court held that a prisoner has no right to 
the presence of counsel at a prison disciplinary hearing.50 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in these cases, 
lower courts have generally concluded that the presence of coun- 
sel is not mandatory in civil proceedings, despite the fact that 
information elicited might provide the basis for subsequent crimi- 
nal charges. Thus, courts have held that suspects facing possible 
criminal charges have no due process right to the presence of their 
attorneys at coroner's inquests,51 motor vehicle license revocation 
hearings,52 doctor disciplinary  proceeding^,^^ or police disciplinary 
proceedings .54 
47. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1290-92 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and 
remanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on rehearing, 510 F.2d 534 
(1st Cir.), rev'd, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). The First Circuit did not intend to limit the right to 
counsel to situations where criminal charges were pending. To the contrary, the court 
would have extended the right to counsel to prisoners not yet charged because their 
misconduct is punishable as a crime and their testimony might be used in a later prosecu- 
tion for the same misconduct. 
48. 425 U.S. 308, 317 (1976). 
49. Id. at 322 n.5. 
50. Id. at 315. The interpretation of Baxter is a subject of controversy in the instant 
case. See note 78 infra. 
51. E.g., United States v. Pate, 427 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 
914 (1971). But cf. State v. Halvorsen, 79 S.D. 209, 110 N.W.2d 132 (1961) (the absence 
of counsel for one subpoenaed and suspected of homicide may be pertinent in determining 
whether he has been denied his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination). 
52. E.g., Ferguson v. Gathright, 485 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 
933 (1974). But cf. the dissent in this case: 
Ferguson was convicted of driving after his license had been revoked, and 
he was sentenced to three years in prison. Although he was represented at that 
trial, his counsel could not question the issues determined at his uncounseled 
revocation hearing. Therefore, I would hold that-absent a valid waiver-a 
person cannot be constitutionally imprisoned where an essential element of his 
crime was conclusively adjudicated in a license revocation proceeding where he 
was prejudiced by the lack of counsel. 
Id. at 509 (Butzner, J., dissenting). 
53. E.g., Suess v. Pugh, 245 F. Supp. 661 (N.D.W. Va. 1965). 
54. E.g., Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 455 F.2d 490 
(7th Cir. 1972). 
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II. INSTANT CASE 
In considering the instant case, the First Circuit acknowl- 
edged that most courts have declined to recognize a right to coun- 
sel in college disciplinary hearings.s5 Nevertheless, after applying 
the procedural due process balancing tests6 it upheld the district 
court's injunction, ruling that appellee had the right to the pres- 
ence of counsel at the disciplinary hearing." However, the court 
did not reach or decide the issue of whether he had the right to 
full representation, with counsel conducting direct and cross- 
e~amina t ion .~~ 
The court viewed the pending criminal charges against ap- 
pellee as the factor which tipped the balance in his favor." It 
found appellee would be unconstitutionally deprived of due pro- 
cess if, without the presence of counsel and in the face of the 
pending criminal action, he was forced to choose between the risk 
of expulsion and the risk of self-incrimination at the hearinge60 
The presence of counsel would not remove all risks, the court 
conceded, but would enable appellee to make an intelligent 
choice between the risks he would face in testifying at the hear- 
ing! 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Campbell argued that the 
existence of pending criminal charges is irrelevant to the question 
of the right to counsel at a disciplinary hearing.62 He warned that 
the holding of the court "opens the door to a claim of right to 
counsel in almost all student disciplinary  proceeding^."^^ He re- 
55. 582 F2d at 104. Likewise, the district court had stated: "The court is aware that 
the weight of authority generally supports the position of the defendants." Gabrilowitz v. 
Newman, No. 77-686 (D.R.I. Dec. 15, 1977) (order granting preliminary injunction). In 
truth, however, there seems to be no "weight of authority" on either side. See notes 16- 
25, 30 and accompanying text supra. 
56. 582 F.2d at 105. The court quoted the test as outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See note 11 supra. 
57. 582 F.2d a t  107. 
58. Id. at 101. The injunction issued by the district court was interpreted by the First 
Circuit to mean that appellee's attorney would be entitled to represent appellee by con- 
ducting direct and cross-examination. However, counsel for appellee stated at oral argu- 
ment that all appellee wanted was the presence of his lawyer during the hearing for 
consultation and advice. Consequently, the First Circuit limited itself to the question of 
whether appellee was entitled to the presence of an attorney at the hearing, without active 
participation by the attorney. 
59. Id. a t  107. 
60. Id. at 104, 107. 
61. Id. a t  106. 
62. Id. a t  107 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 
315 (1976)). See note 78 infra. 
63. 582 F.2d at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
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jected the court's finding that it was necessary to extend to appel- 
lee the right to the presence of counsel a t  the hearing, since appel- 
lee could receive most of the benefits of his attorney's presence 
by consulting with him both before the proceeding began and 
outside the hearing room while the proceeding was in progress." 
A. Examination of the Court's Reasoning 
1. Application of due process balancing test 
In applying the due process balancing test set forth in 
Mathews v. Eldridge," the court adequately pinpointed appel- 
lee's private interests. They were three-fold: (1) to avoid making 
incriminating statements at the hearing that could be used 
against him at his criminal trial, (2) to fully participate in the 
hearing to protect himself from expulsion, and (3) to make an 
intelligent choice between the risk of self-incrimination and the 
risk of expulsion at the hearing? The court also correctly assessed 
64. Id. 
65. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See note 11 supra. 
66. 582 F.2d at 105-06. There was no attempt by the court to classify appellee's 
interest in remaining in college as a liberty or a property interest; nor was a determination 
made as to whether his attendance at college was a right or a privilege. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975), the Supreme Court concluded that 
students facing temporary suspension from a public school have property and liberty 
interests that qualify for protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend- 
ment. Appellants in the instant case sought to distinguish Goss by arguing that, although 
students have a right to attend lower public schools, the state confers only a privilege to 
attend college. Brief for Appellants at 26. However, this "right versus privilege" argument 
has been rejected by the Supreme Court. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
571 (1972) ("[Tjhe Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 
'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the application of procedural due 
process rights.") (footnote omitted); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) 
("[Tlhis Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether 
a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' "); Cafeteria & 
Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,894 (1961) (" 'One may not have 
a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the Government may not prohibit one from 
going there unless by means consonant with due process of law.' ") (quoting Homer v. 
Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (1961)). See also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 
F.2d at 156 ("['Tlhe State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the 
renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process."). 
Appellee's interest in protecting himself from the risk of expulsion, whether viewed 
as involving a property interest, liberty interest, right, or privilege, was not recognized by 
either the district court or the First Circuit as a sufficient justification for requiring a right 
to counsel at the hearing. See note 92 infra. Yet, courts and commentators who have 
advocated a right to counsel at disciplinary hearings have concluded that the risk of 
expulsion alone mandates the presence of counsel. See note 22 and accompanying text 
supra. The student's potential loss of the opportunity to complete his education is viewed 
by some as far outweighing any intrusions upon the college that would result from recog- 
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the predominant interest of the university: "Academic institu- 
tions have a significant interest in the promulgation of procedures 
for the resolution of student disciplinary  problem^."^^ 
After identifying and weighing the conflicting interests of the 
student and the university, the court must, under procedural due 
process analysis, consider (1) "the risk of an erroneous depriva- 
tion of . . . [the private interests] through the procedures used" 
and (2) "the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural  safeguard^."^ In the instant case, the first considera- 
tion required an evaluation of appellee's risk of erroneously for- 
feiting his privilege against self-incrimination at  the disciplinary 
hearing. The second consideration required a determination of 
the probable value of the presence of appellee's attorney in the 
hearing room. 
The First Circuit concluded that the risk of erroneous depri- 
vation of appellee's privilege against self-incrimination was sub- 
stantial? However, this risk may not have been as great as the 
court feared in light of the university's peer review system,70 a 
facet of the university's procedures not discussed by the court. If 
the disciplinary board had been comprised solely of faculty mem- 
bers, or if the hearing were to have been conducted by counsel for 
the university, there would have been a more substantial need for 
the presence of counsel to ensure that appellee's interests were 
adequately protected." However, in the instant case, the discipli- 
nary board was comprised primarily of students who probably 
had no greater skill than appellee in dealing with disciplinary 
proceedings. In addition, the fact that appellee had a right to the 
assistance of an advisor of his choice from within the university 
community decreased the danger that he would be coerced or 
tricked into incriminating himself at the hearing.72 
nizing a student's right to counsel. As stated in Developments in the Law-Academic 
Freedom, 81 HAW. L. REV. 1045, 1141 (1968) (footnote omitted), "[Wlhat seems to the 
administrator a minor problem may be to the student the disaster of his life." 
67. 582 F.2d at 106. See also Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972); Wasson v. 
Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Morales v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 997 
(D.N.H. 1976); Furutani v. Ewigleban, 297 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 1969). 
The court in the instant case felt that the university's interest in formulating discipli- 
nary procedures would be only minimally affected, since the presence of counsel would 
serve only to protect appellee's rights at the future criminal trial and not to influence the 
results of the disciplinary hearing. 582'F.2d at  106. 
68. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
69. 582 F.2d at 106. 
70. The disciplinary board at  the University of Rhode Island was composed of six 
students and one member of the faculty. Brief for Appellants at 8. 
71. See, e.g. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); French v. 
Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969). 
72. See note 2 supra. 
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The value of the presence of appellee's attorney at  the hear- 
ing was likewise called into question by Judge Campbell in his 
dissenting opinion. Although the majority intimated that the 
critical choices faced by appellee could be made only at the hear- 
ing,73 Judge Campbell argued persuasively that appellee's deter- 
mination of whether or not to testify a t  the hearing, including the 
threshold evaluation of the effect his statements might have on 
the subsequent criminal case, could be made before the hearing 
began. He also mentioned the availability of periodic consulta- 
tions with counsel outside the hearing room during the discipli- 
nary  proceeding^.^' Thus, the value of the additional procedural 
safeguard of counsel in the hearing room may be less than what 
the court indicated in its opinion.75 
2. Pertinent case law not addressed by the court 
The court did not discuss in its opinion one line of relevant 
Supreme Court decisions which, although not strictly preceden- 
tial, are at least important to the resolution of the issues pre- 
sented in the instant case. These are the cases holding that wit- 
nesses a t  investigative proceedings have no right to the presence 
of counsel even though they may be under suspicion and face 
possible criminal ~harges.~Wowever, these cases do not necessar- 
ily run contrary to the court's decision. In fact, the court could 
have noted the strong dissents and the important distinguishing 
features in these cases in order to provide support for its holding 
in the instant case." Unfortunately, these Supreme Court deci- 
73. 582 F.2d at 105. 
The private interest and risk of erroneous deprivation that will be affected 
by the refusal of the hearing board to allow appellee the assistance of counsel 
depend upon the choice made at the hearing. If appellee chooses not to risk self- 
incrimination, he risks loss of his college degree. If he chooses to protect his 
degree, he risks self-incrimination and possible imprisonment of up to twenty 
years. All that appellee asks is that he be allowed the advice of counsel when 
he throws his college degree into the balance against a possible loss of liberty. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
74. Id. at 107-08 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
75. One reason mentioned by the court for allowing the presence of counsel at the 
disciplinary hearing was to provide the opportunity for counsel to "observe the proceeding 
first-hand so as to be better prepared to deal with attempts to introduce evidence from 
the hearing at a later criminal proceeding." 582 F.2d at 106 (footnote omitted). However, 
the court cited no authority for the proposition that an accused's attorney must be permit- 
ted to observe a private civil hearing for the purpose of plotting strategy for an upcoming 
criminal trial. Neither grand jury investigations nor other investigative proceedings per- 
mit such a luxury; nor is the prosecuting attorney invited to disciplinary hearings to help 
him in the preparation of his case. 
76. See notes 32-43 and accompanying text supra. 
77. For example, In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), seems to stand for the proposition 
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sions were not confronted by the court and their possible conflict 
with the instant case was left unres~lved.~~ 
B. Alternative Means of Protecting a Student's Rights 
In order to evaluate the soundness of the court's decision in 
the instant case it is necessary to discuss alternative resolutions 
to the self-incrimination dilemma presented by parallel civil and 
criminal proceedings. There are several such alternative resolu- 
tions possible. For example, a federal court has authority to stay 
a civil proceeding when it may prejudice an accused's rights at a 
pending criminal trialeTg But while this might be a reasonable 
that the fourteenth amendment does not guarantee the right to counsel when the worst 
that can result from a state proceeding is the elicitation of information that might be used 
against the witness in some subsequent criminal trial. However, at the time of Groban, 
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination had not been incorporated into 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. State, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). The privilege against self- 
incrimination was not protected from state action until after Groban. See, e.g., Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
Also, the court in the instant case could have noted court decisions holding that where 
a grand jury investigation is directed against a particular person in such a way that the 
person stands in the status of an accused, unless he is accorded the same rights as a 
defendant in a criminal action, his privilege against self-incrimination protects him from 
taking the witness stand. E.g., United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1967); 
People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961), appeal 
dismissed, 374 U.S. 104 (1963); Commonwealth v. Gross, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 92 A.2d 
251 (1952). Contra, United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U S .  
897 (1955) ("suspect-accused" dichotomy criticized). 
78. The court did discuss and attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court cases involv- 
ing prison disciplinary hearings. Although the dissent felt that Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 
U.S. 308 (1976), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), necessarily make the factor 
of pending criminal charges irrelevant to the issue of the right to counsel in a parallel civil 
proceeding, 582 F.2d at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting), the majority felt that prison hear- 
ings can be distinguished from college disciplinary proceedings. The court pointed to "the 
exceptional nature of the prison context" and "[rlepeated references [in the prison 
cases] to the exigencies attending prison settings and the concomitant inappropriateness 
of applying inflexible due process standards . . . . "Id. at 105 n.4 (majority opinion). See 
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 322 n.5; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U S  a t  560. 
In addition, the court noted "the absence of pending criminal charges in those cases." 
582 F.2d at 105 n.4. In Baxter, the Supreme Court had intimated that the absence of 
pending criminal charges was a controlling factor in its determination that the prisoner 
was not entitled to counsel at his prison disciplinary hearing. 425 U S .  at 317. 
The court cited Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), as a prison case illustrat- 
ing that because of the pendency of criminal charges, even within the prison setting there 
are instances where the right to counsel is essential to ensure due process. 582 F.2d a t  105 
n.4. However, it was not the pendency of criminal charges alone that formed the basis for 
the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis, but the fact that the prisoner was in custody and 
had been interrogated by a state official, so that this Miranda rights had attached. 391 
U.S. a t  4-5. 
79. See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 11-27 (1970); Arthurs v. Stern, 
560 F.2d 477, 479 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 768 (1978). For a discussion of 
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solution in some cases, it would not have been an adequate rem- 
edy in the instant case. Appellee was a senior a t  the university 
and would have graduated by the time the criminal trial was 
~omple t ed .~~  To stay the proceedings under these circumstances 
would have been a greater intrusion upon the university than to 
allow appellee to have his attorney present a t  the hearing. The 
university would have lost its opportunity to enforce its discipli- 
nary rules. 
Instead of staying the civil hearing, the court conceivably 
could have fashioned an "exclusionary rule," holding that when 
a college disciplinary hearing precedes the disposition of criminal 
charges arising out of the same alleged misconduct, the testimony 
of the student a t  the disciplinary hearing is inadmissible against 
him during the subsequent criminal trial?' However, the detri- 
mental impact of refusing to allow the introduction of probative 
evidence a t  the subsequent criminal trial should be weighed 
against the negative effects of permitting counsel to be present a t  
the parallel civil proceeding. In applying such a weighing process, 
most courts will likely prefer to recognize a right to the presence 
of counsel. Indeed, there is general disdain for broadening the use 
of exclusionary rules.82 
Another alternative for the court would have been to recog- 
nize a right to full representation, with counsel participating in 
the court's authority to stay civil proceedings until after the completion of a criminal trial 
arising out of the same set of facts, see Note, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 
67 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1967); Note, Federal Courts-Discovery-Stay of Discovery in 
Civil Court to Protect Proceedings in Concurrent Criminal Action-The Pattern of 
Remedies, 66 MICH. L. REV. 738 (1968). 
80. Brief for Appellants at 14-15. 
81. The First Circuit suggested a similar solution in Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 
1280 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974), aff'd in part and rev'd 
in part on rehearing, 510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir.), rev'd, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). The court deemed 
use immunity to be "a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege 
against self-incrimination and the legitimate requirements of prison disciplinary proce- 
dures," and held that "[wlhere the possibility exists of . . . [a state] inmate being 
penalized for the same criminal conduct in a disciplinary hearing and a criminal trial, he 
should be entitled to 'use' immunity for statements he might make within the prison 
disciplinary hearing." 487 F.2d at 1289-90. 
In People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 (1975), the 
California Supreme Court fashioned an exclusionary rule for probation revocation hear- 
ings. The court held that whenever the hearing precedes disposition of criminal charges 
arising out of the alleged violations of probation conditions, upon timely objection the 
testimony of a probationer given at the hearing is inadmissible against him during the 
subsequent criminal trial, except for impeachment purposes. 
82. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,443-60 (1976), for a lengthy discus- 
sion and list of commentators who discourage the practice of broadening the use of exclu- 
sionary rules. 
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direct and cross-examination." There may be times when full 
representation will be necessary under due process analysis, such 
as when the university presents its own case through legal coun- 
sel?' However, the court's unwillingness to address the issue of 
complete representation was justified. It was, in fact, the decision 
of appellee's attorney to narrow the issue to whether the presence 
of counsel was required.85 Any attempt by the court to resolve the 
issue of complete representation would have been unnecessary to 
the court's holdingY 
C .  Evaluation of the Court's Holding 
The question facing the court in the instant case was whether 
or not to recognize the right of appellee to have his lawyer present 
at the hearing. The balance does not tip as heavily toward appel- 
lee as the court concluded when the composition of the discipli- 
nary board, the right to nonlegal counsel from within the univer- 
sity community, and the protection that appellee's lawyer could 
' provide without being present are all considered in the weighing 
process." However, if these considerations are weighed against 
the risk of expulsion, a serious deprivation underemphasized by 
the court,88 it becomes evident that appellee would face a di- 
lemma a t  the disciplinary hearing that is not faced in other types 
83. See, e.g., Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1,484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 
Cir. 1973); Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 466-67 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Marin v. 
University of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 
209 (W.D.N.C. 1972); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333,1338 (E.D. La. 1969). But cf. 
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (defend- 
ing student permitted to have counsel present with him a t  the hearing to advise him, but 
attorney could not conduct direct and cross-examination). 
84. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); French v. 
Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969). In French, the "prosecution" at the 
college disciplinary hearing was conducted by a senior law school student who had been 
chosen to prosecute student disciplinary hearings because of his familiarity with legal 
proceedings. The court held that the defending student was entitled to full representation 
of counsel a t  the hearing because even though the law student was not an attorney his 
abilities to conduct the prosecution were much superior to the student's ability to defend. 
85. See note 58 supra. Perhaps counsel for appellee sensed that appellee's case might 
be lost on the full representation issue. See note 92 infra. 
86. Another issue that was not necessary for the court to discuss, but which presents 
a perplexing question, is whether a student's constitutional right to have counsel present 
at his disciplinary hearing requires the appointment of counsel when the student is indi- 
gent. For a discussion of this issue, see French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. 
La. 1969). See also Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1291-92 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated 
and remanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on rehearing, 510 F.2d 
534 (1st Cir.), rev'd, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), for the First Circuit's analysis of the issue of 
retained versus appointed counsel within the prison disciplinary context. 
87. See notes 70-75 and accompanying text supra. 
88. See note 92 infra. See also note 66 supra. 
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of civil proceedings, even where the pendency of criminal 
charges is a factor. 
The grand jury witness, the suspect in an investigative pro- 
ceeding, and even appellee in the criminal trial face one major 
risk in testifying-the risk of self-incrimination. At the discipli- 
nary hearing, appellee faces both the risk of self-incrimination 
and the risk of expulsion. What he says at the hearing, and what 
he refuses to say, will affect both his opportunity to remain in 
college and his opportunity to safeguard his defense in the up- 
coming criminal trial. The presence of counsel can provide on- 
the-spot assistance as appellee is confronted with questions that 
require him to choose between the risks of expulsion and self- 
incrimination. The necessity of choosing between these risks, 
which may exist with every question asked at the hearing, pro- 
vides a compelling reason for recognizing a right to counsel in the 
instant case? 
D. Implications of the Decision 
Gabrilowitz will probably stand not merely for the proposi- 
tion that a student may have a right to counsel at a college disci- 
plinary hearing, but also for the proposition that, in order to 
protect his privilege against self-incrimination, an accused may 
- -- 
89. Periodic consultations with counsel outside the hearing room between questions, 
which was suggested by the dissent, may result in an unnecessarily lengthy proceeding 
and would likely be a greater infringement upon the university than the presence of 
counsel in the hearing room. See Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280,1292 (1st Cir. 1973), 
vacated and remanded, 418 U S .  908 (1974), aff'd in part and reu'd in part on rehearing, 
510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir.), reu'd, 425 U S .  308 (1976). 
In recognizing a right to counsel on the basis of pending criminal charges, courts are 
admittedly faced with an interesting problem. Arguably, as Judge Campbell pointed out 
in his dissent, recognizing a right to counsel when a student faces pending criminal charges 
is just a short step away from requiring counsel for most students facing possible expulsion 
a t  a disciplinary hearing. 
Most conduct of a serious enough nature to merit disciplinary action will involve 
a t  least colorable misdemeanors, if not felonies, and a student very well might 
contend that the fact that criminal charges may be brought, even if they are 
not pending, requires the presence of counsel at his hearing. 
582 F.2d a t  107 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, there seems to be little justification for denying the right to counsel to one 
who faces possible criminal charges when his interest in avoiding self-incrimination may 
be as great as one who has already been charged. Also, if a right to counsel is recognized 
for only a person previously charged, a state might be encouraged to postpone bringing 
charges against an individual until after the civil proceeding, so that a right to counsel 
would not attach. 
Resolution of the problems outlined above are difficult in the abstract. However, in 
the context of a specific case, these problems are merely additional factors to be consid- 
ered in the application of the due process balancing test. 
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have a due process right to counsel at a parallel civil proceeding. 
The fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination is 
generally interpreted today as protecting only compelled testi- 
mony. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that "the Fifth 
Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a 
'genuine compulsion of testimony.' "" However, the court in the 
instant case seems to have concluded that additional protection 
is necessary to ensure that a potential self-incriminator makes 
intelligent and informed choices regarding the exercise of his con- 
stitutional prerogatives. This protection, the court intimated, can 
only be provided by the presence of legal counsel in the hearing 
room." Thus Gabrilowitz promotes greater protection against the 
danger that an accused might forfeit, by ignorance or pressure, 
his privilege against self-incrimination. 
The effect of Gabrilowitz on college disciplinary hearings 
may be substantial. However, this case does not stand for the 
position that a student has an automatic right to counsel at a 
college disciplinary hearing? Rather, the case should be read as 
an affirmance of the position that procedural due process, by its 
very nature, is a flexible system for protecting the private inter- 
ests of  individual^.^^ 
90. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) (quoting Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)). 
91. 582 F.2d a t  i05-06. 
92. Both the district court and the First Circuit would likely have denied appellee a 
right to counsel on the basis of the risk of expulsion alone. The district judge stated: "If 
this controversy stopped a t  the schoolhouse door, the court would be hesitant to enter in 
it. . . . But, the consequences of this plaintiffs participation in what otherwise might be 
strictly a University affair, reaches well beyond the University walls in terms of potential 
effect upon the plaintiff." Gabrilowitz v. Newman, No. 77-686 (D.R.I. Dec. 15, 1977) 
(order granting preliminary injunction). 
Likewise, the First Circuit preferred not to intrude upon the university on the basis 
of the risk of expulsion alone. The role of counsel spelled out by the court looks almost 
exclusively toward the pending criminal action. 
The limited role of counsel that we are considering . . . would not be very 
intrusive. Counsel would be present only to safeguard appellee's rights a t  the 
criminal proceeding, not to affect the outcome of the disciplinary hearing. Coun- 
sel's principal functions would be to advise appellee whether he should answer 
questions and what he should not say so as to safeguard appellee from self- 
incrimination; and to observe the proceeding firsthand so as to be better pre- 
pared to deal with attempts to introduce evidence from the hearing at  a later 
criminal proceeding. 
582 F.2d at  106 (footnotes omitted). 
93. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra. By openly utilizing the procedural 
due process balancing test, the court made the basis for its decision apparent. When a 
court does not utilize the balancing test in its opinion, analysis often stays unrevealed and 
camouflaged in the robes of "following precedent." For example, several courts that have 
not recognized a right to counsel a t  college disciplinary hearings have relied upon the 
CASE NOTES 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision of whether a due process right to counsel exists 
within the setting of a college disciplinary hearing, or any other 
civil proceeding, must be made on a case-by-case basis in the 
exercise of sound di~cret ion?~ However, the court's discretion 
need not be open-ended. Procedural due process issues are best 
resolved by discussing and distinguishing related cases, while 
applying a balancing test to the peculiar facts of the case at hand. 
In Gabrilowitz, the First Circuit utilized the due process bal- 
ancing test to conclude that a student has the right to have coun- 
sel present at a university disciplinary hearing where the conduct 
subject to the disciplinary hearing is also the object of a pending 
criminal proceeding. It is questionable, however, whether the 
court fully recognized the possible impact its decision could have 
on the broader question of whether an accused in a criminal pro- 
ceeding has the right to have his attorney present a t  a parallel 
civil proceeding. Had the court in the instant case been more 
careful in its analysis and more thorough in its use of case author- 
ity, Gabrilowitz might have served as a further protection of the 
rights of individuals facing threats to their fifth amendment priv- 
ilege against self-incrimination. As it now stands, this aspect of 
Gabrilowitz may not be recognized and utilized in succeeding 
cases. 
Rodney Jay Vessels 
omission of that right in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (.961), to justify their result. See note 16 and accompanying 
text supra. However, the criteria for college disciplinary hearings outlined in Dixon should 
not be rigidly adhered to as the only criteria by which a court under all circumstances 
may determine whether a particular procedural safeguard is required. In Dixon, the court 
properly recognized that due process rights are determined by weighing the conflicting 
interests of the parties and by the circumstances surrounding the controversy. 294 F.2d 
at 155. 
94. "The due process right to counsel, usually applied on a case-by-case basis, ex- 
tends a qualified right to counsel to persons not involved in criminal proceedings . . . . " 
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 54 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U S .  778, 788-91 (1973) (case-by-case approach for determining whether to 
permit counsel in parole and probation revocation hearings). 
